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Preface 
This report is part of a study on public sector performance, the role of the public 
sector and public sector reform in Botswana.  The study was commissioned by the 
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  All opinions and conclusions 
presented in the paper are the author’s own. 
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1 Introduction1 
This paper analyzes the optimal scale of the Botswana government, given a policy 
objective of high long-run growth with a reasonably equal income distribution.  The 
development debate has often reflected a view that there is a trade-off between these 
two objectives.2  More recent empirical and theoretical research indicates, however, 
that an equal distribution of income promotes growth by raising the average level of 
human capital in the economy. 3  In addition, equity is associated with political 
stability and social harmony, which are positively related to growth.  Finally, the 
World Economic Forum (1998) finds that there is a positive correlation between their  
competitiveness index and the UNDP’s human development index.  Thus, it appears 
that a competitive economy does not harm social development. 
 
Mineral rich countries have experienced development problems that stem from the 
industrial and institutional structures typical for mineral- led growth.  Mineral-rich 
countries tend to have both big government and an unequal distribution of income.  
This is because the mineral sector is usually capital- intensive, large-scale and 
dominated by some of the largest multinational companies in the world.  
Consequently, mineral- led growth is often based on a narrow industrial base, and the 
income it generates accrues to multinational mineral companies and the government 
in the host country.  Long-run growth and distribution of income therefore depends 
crucially on how government spends and invests the mineral revenue, and to what 
extent it creates space for other economic activities with a growth potential in a 
competitive environment.   
 
In a well-managed mineral- led economy, the problems with inequality are of a 
temporary nature.  Social development simply takes more time than it takes to achieve 
a middle income level based on exports of vast mineral resources.  It also takes time 
to accumulate the human capital on which sustained long-run growth is founded. 
Therefore, social development typically lags behind the level of income per capita in 
mineral- rich developing countries during the investment and development phase of 
the mineral sector, while social development catches up during the harvesting phase if 
resources are spent well.4 
 
Botswana has experienced an unusually long- lived diamond sector boom from the 
early 1980s. The world diamond market is dominated by De Beers.  Its trading arm, 
the Central Selling Organization (CSO) has close to a monopoly on world sales of 
gem quality diamonds.  In Botswana diamonds are produced by Debswana, a joint 
venture between the Botswana government and De Beers.  The peak of the mineral 
boom was probably reached with the extension of the Orapa mine that came on stream 
in 1999 and operates at full capacity from early 2000.  The mineral sector is thus 
maturing in Botswana, and a continued mineral-boom is unlikely. The Botswana 
government is currently in a process of reassessing its role in the economy.  Based on 
                                                                 
1 I am grateful to Abdalla Gergis and a workshop audience in Gaborone, Botswana, October 2000 for 
useful comments and suggestions. 
2 E.g., the Kuznets curve (Kuznets 1955). 
3 See for example Galor and Zeira (1993). 
4 Social development tends to lag behind economic development in all countries (Easterly 1999), but 
more so in resource-rich countries because a mineral boom is less human capital-intensive than growth 
driven by productivity improvements in agriculture, manufacturing and services.    
 2 
the assumption that the mineral boom is over, it is realized that government’s share of 
total GDP can not be sustained without running into serious deficit problems (Jeffris 
1999).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section two briefly reviews the mineral-
and government- led development that has taken place in Botswana during the last 
couple of decades.  Section 3 discusses the division of labor between the government 
and the private sector regarding the provision of private goods and services. The issue 
of efficiency versus distribution is discussed in section 4. We emphasize that an equal 
distribution of income is good for growth, but some measures to achieve equality may 
create distortions and efficiency losses.  Section 5 discusses the role of government in 
economic growth.  Finally, section 6 draws some conclusions about the role of 
government in enhancing growth in Botswana during a critical period of 
transformation from a mineral- led economy to an industrialized economy.  
Industrialization is interpreted in a broad sense meaning the introduction of modern 
industrial technology in the production of goods and services.  
 
2 The mineral sector and the government 
2.1 The scale of government 
The Botswana economy is dominated by the mineral sector on the production side and 
by the government on the expenditure side of GDP.  Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show GDP 
by sector of origin and GDP by expenditure category respectively. The mining sector 
constituted more than a third of GDP in 1998/99, while general government provision 
of services accounted for more than a sixth of GDP.  The two sectors combined 
produce slightly more than half of the country’s value added, or GDP.   
 
Figure 2.1.  GDP by sector 1998/99 
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Source: Central Statistics Office 
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Figure 2.2.  GDP by expenditure 1998/99 
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Source: Central Statistics Office 
 
Turning to the expenditure side, government consumption accounted for almost 29 
percent of total GDP in 1998/99, while government development expenditure 
accounted for about half of gross fixed capital formation. 5  The year 1998/99 is 
exceptional in the sense that there is a negative net exports, following the Asian 
financial crisis.  This was the first year since 1983/84 that there has been a trade 
deficit and the country probably returned to a surplus in 1999/2000 and 2000/01.  
Although the deficit in 1998/99 is not representative for Botswana’s current account 
position during the past two decades, it shows how vulnerable the economy is to ups 
and downs in the diamond market.  Government consumption as a share of GDP is  
high in international comparison.  The world average was 15 percent in 1999, while 
the average for middle income countries was 12 percent – less than half the share in 
Botswana (World Bank 2000).   
 
The interrelationship between the scale of government activities and the mineral 
sector is illustrated in figure 2.3, which shows the composition of government 
revenue.   
 
                                                                 
5 Government development expenditure is not entirely on investment or fixed capital formation, but 
most of it is, and development expenditure can thus be taken as a good proxy for government 
investment. 
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Figure 2.3.  Composition of government revenue 1998/99 
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Source: Central Statistics Office 
 
Taxes on the mineral sector accounted for 49 percent of total revenue in 1998/99.  In 
addition, other property income, which entails royalties from the mineral sector and 
Bank of Botswana’s earnings on international reserves, accounted for 15 percent. 
Finally, interest income, mainly on accumulated mineral revenue, accounted for 
another 3 percent.  The mineral sector therefore accounted for close to two thirds of 
total government revenue, directly and indirectly, this year.  
 
Finally, figure 2.4 shows the role of government as an employer.  Central Government 
accounts for 34 percent of formal sector employment, while local government adds 
another 8 percent.  Total public sector employment, including the parastatals, 
accounts for about 48 percent of total employment.  Looking at recent trends, the 
share of central government in total employment increased from 25 to 34 percent 
during the 6-year period 1992-98, while local government employment increased 
from 6 to 8 percent of the total.  There has in other words been a substantial increase 
in the government share of total employment, as well as an increase in the absolute 
number of government employees.  This has happened during a period of slow growth 
in overall employment.  Thus, total employment increased by only 4.7 percent from 
1992 to 1998, while central government employment increased by 40 percent during 
the same period. 
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Figure 2.4.  Employment by sector 1998 
Private
52 %
Parastatal
6 %
Central govt.
34 %
Local govt
8 %
 
Source: Central Statistics Office 
 
In order to fully assess the government's role in the economy, it is important to look at 
the allocation of different categories of labor between the main sectors of the 
economy.  Table 2.1 shows the skill composition of employees in each major sector, 
taken from the latest labor force survey in 1995/96. 
 
Table 2.1: Composition of labor force according to training by sector 
 Central 
government 
Local 
government 
Parastatals  Traditional 
agriculture 
Informal 
sector 
Private 
sector 
No training 47.8 78.6 59.2 98 90.7 72.7 
Humanity 22.0 0.9 2.5 0.2 0.5 2.0 
Social 
science 
8.1 9.3 16.4 0.2 1.4 9.3 
Natural 
science 
6.2 2.3 1.4 0 0.3 2.3 
Craft and 
industry 
4.1 5.0 13.4 0.8 4.8 7.4 
Engineering 
and other 
technical  
3.8 1.0 3.4 0.1 0.5 2.8 
Service 
trades 
7.9 2.3 3.3 0.6 1.7 3.2 
Other 0.1 0.5 0.4 0 0 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Republic of Botswana  
 
Clearly, the Central Government is the most skill- intensive sector in the economy.  
The second most skill- intensive sector is the parastatal sector. Unsurprisingly, 
traditional agriculture and the informal sector are the sectors that are the least skill-
intensive.  Note, however, the large share of the labor force employed in the private 
sector that has no training. Table 2.2 shows how the various skill categories in the 
Botswana economy are distributed on sectors. 
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Table 2.2. Distribution of skill categories among sectors  
 Central 
govt 
Local govt Parastatals  Traditional 
agriculture 
Informal 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Total 
No training 14.1 12.3 2.8 18.6 20.3 31.8 100 
Humanity 83.1 1.9 1.5 0.6 1.6 11.4 100 
Social 
science 
26.5 16.0 8.6 0.5 3.4 45.1 100 
Natural 
science 
55.1 11.0 2.0 0.2 1.9 29.9 100 
Craft and 
industry 
16.9 11.0 8.9 2.3 15.2 45.6 100 
Engineering 
and other 
technical 
39.7 5.8 5.7 0.9 4.2 43.7 100 
Service 
Trades 
49.0 7.6 3.4 2.2 8.1 29.7 100 
Other 15.1 28.9 7.1 0 0 49 100 
Source: Republic of Botswana  
 
The two biggest employers in the economy are the central government and the private 
sector, while parastatals and the local government are relatively small.  Further, 
government is by far the biggest employer of people with training in humanity 
sciences.  A large share of these is school teachers.  But also natural sciences and 
service trades are dominated by government.  Only in engineering and craft and 
industry is the private sector more important as an employer of skilled labor than the 
government.  We will discuss in section 5 to what extent this allocation of skilled 
labor is the most conducive for growth and overall employment.   
 
2.2 Mineral-led development 
Botswana has the industrial structure and the dominance of the government in 
common with several other mineral-rich countries.  Botswana is a maturing mineral-
exporting country facing the challenges of a transformation from mineral- led growth 
to diversification and the establishment of new engines of growth.  The 
transformation in successful mineral-rich countries can be represented by the 
following five stages: 
 
1. Rapid economic growth driven by investment in large-scale mineral projects and 
the coming on stream of production from these projects; 
2. Injection of the mineral rents into the local economy in the form of investment in 
infrastructure, health and education.  Rapid expansion of the public sector; 
3. Establishment of resource intensive downstream industries through local and 
foreign investments; 
4. The establishment of service industries both within the public and private sectors; 
5. Continued growth based on private investments in more skill- intensive industries.  
The private sector grows faster than the public sector. 
 
Note that labor- intensive industrialization is absent from this development path.  This 
is because the dominance of the mineral and government sectors drives costs and 
thereby typically renders labor- intensive industries uncompetitive.  Therefore, large-
scale resource- intensive industries and skill- intensive industries are more commonly 
found in natural resource-rich countries.  Botswana has successfully gone through the 
first two phases of this development path (see Nordås et. al. 1998).  Since Botswana's 
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major mineral resource, diamonds, are not subject to large-scale downstream 
processing, the development will probably leapfrog the third stage.  The challenge the 
country faces now is to move on to stage 4 and 5.     
3 Government provision of private goods 
Governments provide private goods and services because of market imperfections 
such as externalities, imperfect financial markets and natural monopolies.  The 
rationale for government provision of social services such as health and education, for 
example, is both redistribution and correction of imperfect credit markets and 
externalities in the accumulation of human capital.  Nevertheless, it has been 
recognized that governments are not always able to introduce measures that rectify 
market failures.  Indeed, governments may have insufficient information to know 
exactly what to do, while policy measures are subject to administrative costs and 
some times unintended side-effects. In addition market failures appear to have been 
reduced significantly over time, mainly due to technological change.  One example is 
technological developments that have substantially reduced the minimum efficient 
scale of electricity supply and communication services, and thereby increased the 
scope for competition in those sectors. Further, communication technology has 
reduced transport costs and globalized markets to the extent that government policies 
need to take into account the impact its policy has on local agents in an international 
context.  Privatization of telecommunications, electricity supply and other utilities has 
proliferated around the world as a result.      
 
The government faces two major challenges during the transition from stage 2 to 
stage 5 in the development path sketched above.  First, it must find the balance of 
providing growth-promoting services without crowding out the private sector. 
Second, given the country’s highly unequal distribution of income and high incidence 
of poverty, it must redistribute income and assets without adversely affecting 
incentives to invest and participate in economic activities.  The balancing of these 
considerations is the focus of our analysis.6  We first assess the cost of government 
service provision compared to the private sector. Second, we discuss the division of 
labor between the private sector and the government in the provision of private goods.  
Examples of such goods are curative health services, economic services, housing, 
transport and utilities.  
 
3.1 The relative cost of  goods and services provided by government 
It has long been a concern that the public sector tends to expand more than 
proportiona lly to the national income in most countries of the world.  One reason for 
this is that the cost of government services tends to grow faster than the costs of 
producing goods and services in the private sector.  This means that even if the level 
of real resources devoted to the public sector (e.g., the share of total employment) 
remains constant and the real cost of the service declines, the relative cost of public 
services still increases if productivity development is slower in the public sector than 
in the private sector.  We illustrate this point by an example:7 
 
                                                                 
6 A study reported in Harberger (1998) finds that there are two major roads out of poverty for the 
individual.  These are setting up a small business or obtain a formal sector job.  The first requires 
access to credit, the second or possibly both require skills.  The study was undertaken in El Salvador.  
7 The example is borrowed from Ferris and West (1996). 
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If productivity in the public sector grows by 1 percent per year, and productivity in 
the private sector grows by 2 percent per year, the cost of public services in terms of 
foregone production in the private sector develops as shown in figure 3.1.  We take as 
the point of departure a base year and choose units of measurement such that the 
relative cost of public services in terms of private goods and services is unity in the 
base year.  Relative costs will then develop as indicated by figure 3.1 over time. 
 
Figure 3.1.  Relative cost of government /private production    
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With this difference in productivity growth, the economy has to forego an ever 
increasing amount of private goods and services in order to sustain production of 
government services. This is a stylized example, but it reflects the development in a 
wide range of countries, and has been seen as a problem in the OECD area.  Given the 
substantial expansion of the public sector in Botswana over the past two decades, we 
would expect to see a development similar to figure 3.1 there.   
 
In practice, productivity growth in the public sector is very difficult to measure.  We 
use the GDP deflator for the general government sector divided by the GDP deflator 
for the private sector as a proxy for relative productivity.  Figure 3.2 depicts this 
measure of relative cost development of general government relative to the non-
mining private sector, the manufacturing sector and private services respectively. 8  If 
the index is increasing, the cost of producing government goods and services rises at a 
faster speed than the cost of producing goods and services in the private sector. We 
first notice that the manufacturing sector is the sector with the largest changes in 
relative costs both relative to the central government sector and relative to the rest of 
the non-mining private sector.  We also note that the direction of change is the same 
for all private sector measures introduced.  The cost of central government production 
improved during the period 1984/85-1986/87 relative to manufacturing and for the 
second half of the period also for the entire private non-mining sector and private 
                                                                 
8 The indices are derived by dividing GDP at current prices by GDP at constant prices for each sector.  
It is not a perfect measure of relative productivity, but in the absence of productivity figures for the 
public sector, it is probably the best available approximation.  
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services.  After a sharp increase in the relative cost of central government during the 
period 1986/87-1990/91, the relative cost of government improved again until 
1997/98.  Over the 15-year period as a whole, the relative cost of central government 
has deteriorated by about 8 percent relative to the non-mining private sector.9 
Compared to figure 3.1, which is representative for OECD countries such as the US 
(Baumol 1993, Ferris and West 1996), Botswana’s public sector performance appears 
to be remarkable.    
 
Figure 3.2.  Relative cost of central government 
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Figure 3.2 suggests that the cost and productivity problems Botswana may have, is 
not a public sector cost problem per see.  In fact, our findings support a study by 
Mandlebe (1997), who finds that productivity development in the government sector 
has been better than in the non-mineral private sector on average during the period 
1974 – 1994.  However, Hagen (1999) finds that education indicators in Botswana lag 
far behind what one should expect compared to the country’s expenditure on 
education and the level of income in the country, suggesting that the education sector 
is not very effective and productive in an international comparison.  A relatively good 
performance of the public sector relative to the local private sector may therefore well 
indicate that both the private and the public sector have a productivity problem in 
international comparison. The reform process underway therefore needs to critically 
assess the impact of government labor market policy, industrial policy and use of 
resources on cost developments and productivity in the private sector.   
 
To our knowledge there are no studies of the impact of government industrial policy 
on productivity and competitiveness of the private sector in Botswana.  There is, 
however, a comprehens ive study of the impact of government interventions such as 
                                                                 
9 Costs rose faster in central government during the period 1979-82 also, but the relative costs 
improved again between 1982 and 1984.  Figures during this period are, however given at 1985/96 
prices and are not compatible with the figures depicted in figure 3.2. 
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tariff protection, import restrictions, credit allocation and tax incentives on 
productivity in South Korean industries (Lee 1996).  The study concludes that tariffs 
and import restrictions decrease productivity growth, while subsidized credits and tax 
incentives had no effect on productivity in the favored industries. These results 
suggest that industrial policy that limits competition and exposure to international best 
practices is bad for produc tivity, while measures that reduce investment costs are not 
harmful for productivity. Botswana’s industrial policy has been dominated by 
measures such as subsidized credits and tax incentives. Although this should not be 
harmful to productivity in a competitive market, Botswana’s market is far less 
competitive than the Korean market, and in some cases the cost of capital is so low 
that over- investment and a low social return to capital may well have resulted.10  In 
addition mineral - and government- led growth has probably contributed to a high cost 
level in the economy as a whole, and thus high costs of other inputs than capital in the 
production process. 
 
 
3.2 Division of labor between government and the private sector in provision of 
private goods 
Government expenditure on private services accounts for about 28 percent of total 
recurrent expenditure and almost 8 percent of GDP in Botswana.  Figure 3.4 shows 
the composition of this expenditure category in 1998/99.11  The share of total 
expenditure going to services that are private in nature and could be provided by the 
market is not particularly high in international comparison, but government provision 
of private goods and services as a share of GDP is high.  
 
Figure 3.4.  Composition of government provision of private services 1998/99 
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Source: Central Statistics Office 
 
                                                                 
10 If that is the case, the likely adjustment after the mineral boom is a convergence towards steady state 
from above, as shown by Rodriguez and Sachs (1999).  See also section 5. 
11 Other services are food and social welfare, local and regional development not elsewhere classified, 
urban infrastructure, cultural recreation, broadcasting and press.  
 11 
In Botswana, it is often argued that the government has to provide a number of private 
services because there is no private supply of such services.  However, if consumers 
consider the service or good the same or almost the same whether provided by 
government or the private sector, government provision of goods and services over 
and above a certain level may well completely crowd out the private sector.  
Government provision is defined as what households get from the government free of 
charge and the subsidy element in cases where households pay for government 
services. If the private sector produces such services more efficiently than the 
government, then there will be an improvement in welfare from privatizing the 
services or scale back government provision and leave the market open for private 
investors.  If the private sector is not more efficient than the government, as figure 3.2 
suggests, gains from privatization would materialize only if privatization is combined 
with measures that ensure enhanced competition and incentives for improving 
productivity in the private sector.  In any case, if government agencies provide private 
goods, it is an acknowledged principle that private and government providers should 
be subject to the same conditions.  Finally, the borderline between the public and 
private sectors should be clear and well defined (Harberger 1998).   
 
4 Government provision of services for redistributive 
purposes 
Botswana has an unequal distribution of income. The Gini-coefficient is estimated at 
0.56 in 1993/94 (Ditlhong 1997), which is among the highest in the world.12  Another 
indicator of uneven income distribution is the difference between the ranking 
according to GDP per capita and the ranking according to UNDP’s human 
development index (HDI).  The difference was –57 for Botswana in 1998, the second 
largest in the world (UNDP 2000).13  Finally, the share of total households below the 
poverty line provides additional information on income distribution.  The share was 
38 percent in 1993/94 (Government of Botswana/UNDP 1998).  This is an 
improvement from earlier estimates during the 1980s, but it is still high, given 
Botswana’s relatively high per capita income, and given the period of time Botswana 
has been a middle- income country.   
 
A more equal distribution of income is probably a precondition for the transition of 
the economy to a diversified economy and growth based on private sector business 
activities.  This is because the cost level in Botswana is such that a relatively high 
productivity level is necessary in order to sustain present income and exchange rate 
levels in a competitive environment.  High productivity in turn can only be achieved 
in an environment of skilled and motivated workers and an effective infrastructure - 
conditions that are usually not found in an environment of widespread poverty.  
 
It has often been argued that there is a trade-off between a more equal distribution of 
income on the one hand and efficiency and growth in the economy on the other hand.  
The reasoning behind this is that redistribution requires relatively high taxes that in 
turn create distortions and disincentives.  In addition, it is argued that high- income 
groups save more than poor people, and tha t redistribution of income would lead to 
                                                                 
12 The Gini coefficient has a value between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the more unequal the income 
distribution. 
13 Gabon has the highest difference with –60. 
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lower savings and investment and thereby slower growth.  Finally, it is argued that 
when there is indivisibility in investment combined with imperfect credit markets,  
wealth needs to be concentrated in order ensure large-scale investments.  While the 
first argument is widely accepted, the others are highly controversial.  First, it has 
been shown that when imperfect credit markets are combined with diminishing 
returns to capital at an individual or project level, there will be more investment and 
growth when income is equally distributed (Benabou 1996).  Second, it has been 
shown that if talent and ideas are distributed randomly in the population, talent and 
ideas are underutilized in an economy with a highly unequal income distribution.  
Third, it has been shown that if the poor can indeed borrow and realize their ideas, the 
terms are often such that the lender will reap a large share of the benefit from the 
borrower’s effort.  The more own resources the borrower can contribute, the more of 
the benefits from his/her efforts will accrue to him/her, and the more effort he/she will 
exert.     Which effects dominate in the real world is an empirical question and most 
recent studies find a negative and significant correlation between inequality and 
economic growth and/or the investment rate.14   
 
Finally we note that there are other ways of achieving a more equal distribution of 
income than redistribution by means of taxes and subsidies.  A redistribution of 
assets, through land reform or privatization of state enterprises, and/or creating equal 
opportunities through equal access to education are thought to be less distortive ways 
of achieving equality. 15  In the two next sections we discuss two approaches, equality 
of outcome and equality of opportunity, to income distribution and their impact on 
efficiency and growth. Policy measures aiming at equal outcome usually revolve 
around progressive taxation and government provision of goods and services, while 
policy measures aiming at equal opportunity largely relate to access to secondary and 
tertiary education, access to credit and programs of rural development.  Policies 
related to equality of outcome are usually analyzed in a context of public economics 
and welfare analysis while policy measures directed at equal opportunity are usually 
analyzed in a dynamic context.  We will follow that pattern in the analysis here. 
 
4.1 Equal outcome 
Public economics addresses the redistribution versus efficiency problem when 
redistribution involves taxes which distort the workings of the market and create 
deadweight losses.  The main conclusions from the literature on income distribution 
through taxation and subsidies suggest that there are limits to what can be achieved 
from such measures.  Harberger (1998) demonstrates through a very simple example 
that even a very progressive tax system does not change income distribution much. 
We copy his table, but with income distribution data for Botswana to illustrate his 
point. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
14 See Benabou (1996) for an overview. 
15 Privatization leads to a more equal distribution of assets if it is done through voucher schemes or 
similar methods as applied in several of the former East European economies. 
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Table 4.1 Income distribution and tax and benefits16 
Income 
group 
(quintile) 
Income 
and 
distributi
on before 
tax 
(1) 
Tax 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
Income 
after tax 
 
 
 
(3)=(1)-(2) 
After tax 
distribution 
 
 
 
(4) 
Benefits 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
Income after 
tax and 
benefits 
 
 
(6)=(3)+(5) 
After tax and 
benefit 
distribution 
 
 
(7) 
First 4.5 0 4.5 6.33 2.89 7.40 8.65 
Second 7.9 1.2 6.7 9.45 2.89 9.62 11.23 
Third 9.3 1.9 7.4 10.47 2.89 10.34 12.08 
Fourth 21.5 6.0 15.5 21.79 2.89 18.37 21.48 
Fifth 56.8 19.9 36.9 51.95 2.89 39.82 46.55 
Total 100 28.9 71.0 100 14.45 85.55 100 
 
For illustrative purposes we have introduced a progressive tax system with the 
average tax rate increasing from zero in the first quintile to 35 percent in the fifth 
quintile.  Distribution is presented as the share of total income earned by each quintile 
in columns (1), (4) and (7).  We follow Harberger in assuming that half of tax receipts 
is spent on services or benefits to which every household has equal access or receives 
the same amount.  The after tax distribution of income in terms of percentages 
received by each quintile is better after tax than before tax, as can be seen from 
comparing the distribution figures in columns (1) and (4).  However, the improvement 
is much better still after an equal amount of benefits have been distributed among 
households as can be seen from column (7) compared to columns (1) and (4) in table.  
The poorest quintile improves its relative position from earning 4.5 percentage of total 
income before taxes and benefits to 6.33 percent after tax, and further to 8.65 percent 
after tax and benefits.  Furthermore, although progressive taxes alone improve the 
relative position of the four poorest quintiles, it is only after the expenditure scheme 
has been introduced that the absolute position of the three poorest quintiles improves 
as well.  
 
A number of papers discuss the optimal policy mix of government expenditure and 
progressive taxation in order to achieve a more equal distribution of income with as 
little efficiency loss as possible.  Crucial to this discussion is the assumptions made 
about to what extent the government can target expenditure to particular groups and to 
what extent it can identify households in a way that makes redistribution through the 
tax system work as intended.  These studies find that if the government can indeed 
identify the characteristics of households such that redistribution through taxes and 
transfers is possible, then such a system is preferable to public expenditure as a 
measure of obtaining a more equal distribution of income.  This is because people can 
choose the level of consumption of services themselves in that case.  However, it has 
proven very difficult in practice to design a cost-effective taxation and transfer system 
that actually benefits the target group as intended.  For practical purposes, therefore, 
public expenditure may be a better alternative.  
 
The expenditure categories that potentially have the largest distributional effects are 
primary education, primary health care and services such as safe water and sewage 
systems.  However, these expenditure categories are often regressive in developing as 
well as developed countries.  Primary schools and health services are quite often of 
                                                                 
16 The figures on income distribution are taken from the 1993/94 survey which is the latest survey 
undertaken.    
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much better quality in affluent areas than in poor urban slums or poor rural areas.  
Moreover, secondary and tertiary education is often more subsidized than primary 
education and it is still the case that a larger proportion of relatively well-off children 
and youngsters attend higher level education.  According to Harberger (1998) it 
would be a great step forward merely to ensure that poor people have access to the 
same quality public services as their better off fellow citizens have.  In Botswana, 
provision of services such as education appears to be regressive.  Table 4.2 shows 
education level by income group.   
 
Table 4.2. Education level by income group, percentage of total 
Income group No education Primary only Secondary Tertiary 
Very low economic resources 36.9 48.55 14.41 0.13 
Low economic resources 24.06 55.53 20.37 0.05 
Better off 15.99 50.33 30.17 3.51 
Source: Republic of Botswana 1996 
 
The table refers to persons aged 5 and over in 1993/94.  It does not fully capture the 
relation between household income and access to education, since a low income can 
be a result of a low level of education rather than a cause.  With this qualification in 
mind, the table shows that only half the share of very low economic resource 
households has obtained secondary education compared to better off households.  It 
is, however worth noticing that as much as 16 percent of persons from well-off 
households have no education.  They probably represent the older generation in well-
off farm and cattle raising households.   Harberger's findings applied to the Botswana 
context suggests that improving the quality of primary and secondary education in 
poor areas should be a priority both for redistributive reasons and, as will be further 
discussed below, reasons of sustained economic growth.  Further discussion of 
education is left to section 4.2 where equal opportunities are analyzed. 
 
We have argued that the evidence points in the direction that benefits are more 
effective instruments of income redistribution than progressive taxes.  Further, we 
have argued that benefits provided in an equal amount to all households significantly 
improve income distribution and represent a notable improvement to the present 
situation in most countries, including Botswana.  Besides, an equal amount to all 
households is easier to administer than a more complex system.    
  
4.1.1 Taxes and benefits versus markets 
We now turn to the issue of to what extent benefits should be given in the form of 
income transfers or through public provision of services in more detail.  The 
government has the choice whether to produce services itself, or alternatively pay 
poor households a transfer such that the household can purchase the good or service in 
question in the market.  It has been argued in the literature (Arrow 1971) that the 
latter solution is better because the government does not know household preferences.  
 
In the following we will assume that services of a private nature, e.g., services that 
can in principle be produced and sold in a market, can be produced either by 
government or the private sector and the two sectors produce close substitutes.  
Further we assume that households' demand for the service in question is positive and 
depends on household income and the price of the service.  If the service is sold in the 
market, its distribution among households depends on the income distribution in the 
economy, which is highly unequal as we have already seen.  If government decides to 
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improve distribution through an income transfer, the distribution of the service will 
still be determined by the income distribution, this time the after transfer income 
distribution.  If the poor still consumes less than what is considered appropriate from 
a welfare point of view, government provision of the service may be a solution.  
These arguments usually apply to merit goods and goods and services that cater for 
basic needs.  It is worth noticing that government provision does not necessarily mean 
government production of the service.  It could also mean paying a private company 
for providing a service to all households in a geographical area at subsidized prices or 
for free.  
 
We will now make a rough estimate of a reasonable level of government expenditure 
on private goods and services for reasons of income distribution.  We take as a point 
of departure Harberger's argument that an equal amount of the service to all 
households is a substantial improvement compared to existing practices and that it 
makes sense from efficiency reasons. Further, we will assume that the service is 
financed by a proportional income tax.  Since poor households pay a lower tax in 
absolute terms, but receive the same service as rich households, such a policy will 
have a redistributional effect.  
 
At very low levels of government provision, most households will purchase some of 
the service in question in the private markets.  As the service provision from 
government increases, the lowest income households will switch to government 
provided services and withdraw from the market.  As has been argued in the literature 
(Boadway and Marhand 1995, Epple and Romano 1996) government provision from 
an income distribution point of view should not exceed the level that would make the 
targeted group withdraw from the market. An optimally designed expenditure scheme 
would be such that everybody in the target group switches from the market to the 
government and nobody in the non-targeted groups withdraw from the market.  
 
We assume that the targeted group in Botswana is the households that fall below the 
poverty line. These constitute 38 percent of all households and thus approximately the 
two poorest quintiles of the population who earned about 12 percent of total 
household income in Botswana in 1993/94. We consider private goods and services 
represented in figure 3.1 above only.  In order to estimate what government 
expenditure on these services for redistribution purposes should be, we need data on 
household preferences.  These are not easily observable, and a commonly used proxy 
is the share of total income that households actually spend on these items.  In the 
Botswana case we have household expenditure data only on broad categories of 
services.  Because of lack of data, we resolve to present the amount of government 
expenditure on services that are private in nature and that would exactly crowd out the 
two poorest quintiles from the market as a function of the share of income that these 
households would spend on similar private goods in a market in figure 4.1.17        
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
17 See the appendix for derivation of the figure. 
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Figure 4.1.  Government expenditure for redistributive purposes 
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The figure shows that if poor households' preferences are such that they would spend 
about 20 percent of their income on services such as health, housing and other 
economic services, government should spend at most about 5 percent of GDP on such 
services.  The Botswana government spends about 8 percent of GDP on health, 
housing and economic services, which appears to be on the high side for a reasonable 
range of preferences.     
 
4.2 Equal opportunities 
We now turn to government provision of services, which are important for economic 
opportunities.  Access to education of reasonable quality is crucial for economic 
opportunity, while a high skill premium potentially creates a situation of high 
inequality.  The skill premium in turn is partly a result of skill-biased technological 
change, outside the scope of government policy intervention.  But it may also be a 
result of a combination of subsidized capital and minimum wages set above the 
market-clearing rate.  This combination tilts relative prices in favor of capital, which 
in turn often is complementary to skilled labor while replacing unskilled labor.  
Botswana has to some extent been characterized by such a policy mix, and unskilled 
people largely have to fend for themselves in the informal sector. 
 
Access to education and establishment of small-scale or micro businesses for poor 
people often depends on access to credit. Credit is, however, not always readily 
available to people who can only offer prospects for future earnings as a “collateral”.  
Therefore, due to imperfect credit markets, income inequality tends to persist over 
time as poor households have limited access to education or business opportunities 
that would provide their children with a ticket to a better life.  Note that there is a fine 
line here between subsidizing capital at the expense of the employment of unskilled 
labor and rectifying market failures in the credit market.  The former is detrimental to 
growth with redistribution, the latter is good for growth with redistribution.   
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An interesting study of the evolution of growth and income distribution driven by 
accumulation of human capital is provided by Galor and Zeira (1993).  They combine 
imperfect credit markets and indivisible investment in human capital in a dynamic 
framework.  The indivisibility of human capital investment relates to the fact that the 
investment results in a skill only after an exam is passed or a certificate obtained.  In 
the absence of comprehensive credit markets, parents transfer income to their children 
in order to pay for education.  In addition, students can borrow money, but the market 
for student loans is rationed such that not everyone with the ability to acquire the skill 
in question has access to the necessary funding.   The children of rich parents will 
inherit more than they need for financing education, and will leave more to their 
children than they received from their parents.  Over some generations these families 
will converge towards a high income level where all the family members are 
employed as skilled personnel in the formal economy. Poor families consist of 
unskilled workers often in the informal sector, and they will remain there generation 
after generation.  Neither of these two groups will borrow money, and their relative 
position will remain stable.  The most dynamic group is a middle income group who 
is rich enough to leave a sufficient amount of money to their children to give them 
access to education partly funded by borrowing.  Within this group, those who start 
above a critical level will leave more for their children than they received from their 
parents, and after some generations they will converge towards the rich group.  In 
contrast, those who started below this critical level will borrow so much that they 
leave less for their children than they received from their parents.  This group will 
converge towards the poor, unskilled group after some generations. The more unequal 
distribution of income, the larger is the proportion of total households that falls into 
the two lowest income groups.  Therefore, a country with a highly unequal 
distribution of income runs the risk of stagnation and even decline over time if equal 
opportunity is not secured, and talent and ideas remain unexploited.   One implication 
of Galor and Zeira's analysis is that it is important to have a sufficiently large middle 
class for economic growth.  
 
Lee and Roemer (1998) add the government sector to Galor and Zeira's framework.  
Government provides compulsory, primary education financed by a proportional tax, 
and the individuals invest in further education if they have the necessary means to do 
so.  This captures many of the complex issues of distribution, redistribution measures 
and growth.  First, higher taxes are needed when inequality is large.  Higher taxation 
has a negative impact on private investment, which in turn is negative for growth. 
Second, there is a threshold effect.  People below a critical level of income will not 
invest at all and if a small transfer is made to this group, they will still not invest at 
all, possibly resulting in lower total investment in human capital.  Only if transfers 
reduce the number of people in the poor group will it have a growth effect.  
 
The two studies discussed above agree that the higher the incidence of poverty, the 
slower the growth rate.  The second study takes into account the distortive effects of  
redistribution measures and poor households' supposedly low propensity to save and 
thereby opens the possibility that redistribution does not always improve growth 
performance.   Bearing in mind the qualifications from Lee and Roemer's study, it is 
still very much likely that Botswana's growth performance as the mineral sector levels 
off would improve if income distribution were more equal.  With close to 40 percent 
of the households below the poverty line, Botswana has a high incidence of poverty 
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and it does not have a large middle class. The challenge is to redistribute without 
creating too much distortions and disincentives for entrepreneurs. 
 
Chile is an example of a mineral-exporting country that has experienced a successful 
transition towards stage 4 and 5 in the development path sketched in section 2.  Over 
the past decade and a half, GDP per capita has grown by 3.2 percent per year on 
average, while the Gini coefficient fell from 0.54 to 0.47 and the economy became 
more diversified (Iglesias 1998).  According to this study, Chile reduced 
unemployment among unskilled labor by narrowing the gap between supply and 
demand from both sides.  Better access to education reduced the supply of unskilled 
workers.  Rapid growth and deregulation increased demand for unskilled labor while 
deregulation also led to an increase in the relative size of the formal economy 
compared to the informal economy.  In the Botswana case it is probably the demand 
side that most urgently needs to be addressed through deregulation.   The country 
already spends more than most countries on education, so it appears that the problem 
now lies with the quality of education and the net benefit of investing in education 
from the individual’s point of view.   
5 Government expenditure and economic growth 
Barro (1990) analyzed the role of government for economic growth in a purely 
theoretical setting.  His main prediction is that the relation between government 
expenditure and economic growth is inverted u-shaped.  His basic assumption is that 
government expenditure is confined to areas where markets are imperfect due to 
externalities, information problems and lack of markets.  Such expenditure improves 
productivity in the economy as a whole. However, in order to finance its activity, 
government imposes taxes on the private sector and it diverts resources away from the 
private sector, and thus reduces investment and output in the private sector.   At low 
levels of government expenditure and taxation, the productivity effect is stronger than 
the resource diversion effect, and growth increases with government expenditure.  As 
government expenditure increases, a peak is reached on the inverted u-shaped curve, 
and the resource diversion effect dominates the productivity effect thereafter.  
 
Dowrick (1996) tested Barro's model empirically.  His results support Barro's finding 
that growth is a non-monothonic function of government consumption, e.g., there is 
an optimal size of government that maximizes long-run growth.  However, the 
optimal size varies across countries and over time.  Dowrick (1996) ran a regression 
that included 116 countries, among them Botswana, and found that the optimal size of 
government in terms of government consumption as a share of GDP ranges between 
10 and 18 percent.  Among the 116 countries included in the regression, Botswana 
ranked as number 107 according to government consumption/GDP starting with the 
country with the lowest share, e.g., only 9 countries have a higher government 
consumption/GDP than Botswana.  In Dowrick's data set government 
consumption/GDP was 21.2 percent measured in recurrent domestic prices and 25.5 
percent measured at constant international prices.  Whichever measure is used, 
government consumption is well outside the range of optimal expenditure rates 
according to Dowrick's study.       
 
So far we have implicitly assumed that government expenditure is funded by taxes, 
and ignored Botswana's substantial income due to mineral rents.  However, the 
Botswana government is able to sustain a given expenditure level with lower taxes 
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than most countries because of its mineral revenue.  In the appendix we show 
analytically how the inverted u-shaped curve presented in figure 5.1 below changes 
when we take mineral rents into account.  Here we confine ourselves to presenting the 
graph with no mineral rents and the graph where mineral rents add 20 percent to 
government expenditure over and above what is financed by receipts from taxes on 
income and trade.  The graphs show the optimal growth rate of the economy as a 
function of the tax level, when capital and labor is fully employed. 
 
Figure 5.1.  Economic growth and taxes 
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Diamonds are extracted at relatively low costs compared to their sales value, and most 
if not all the diamonds are exported.  Therefore, mineral rents are analytically similar 
to transfers in a foreign currency.  They can be spent on imports, and if so they do not 
impose extra pressure on local labor and capital markets.  As figure 5.1 indicates, the 
curve with mineral rents lies everywhere above the curve without mineral rents.  
Thus, a higher growth rate can be achieved at the optimal tax rate, as Botswana's 
experience indeed testifies to.   
 
If mineral rents lead to additional pressure on domestic scarce resources such as 
skilled labor, however, the results from the above analysis may change.  Thus, the 
upward shift of the curve as a result of the introduction of mineral rents in figure 5.1 
depends crucially on the assumption that mineral rents are spent on imports.  Further, 
it depends on the assumption that government uses scarce resources such as skilled 
labor and capital in the same proportion as the private sector, and that capital and 
labor are equally productive at the margin in both sectors.  This simplification 
conceals the possibility that some services can not be imported and that mineral rents 
in that case would change relative prices in favor of non- importable services.18  If 
such non- importable services are also produced by a technology that uses scarce 
resources such as skilled and professional labor more intensively than importable 
goods and services, the injection of mineral rents in the economy would introduce 
                                                                 
18 This is the Dutch disease argument. 
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additional pressure on the market for skilled labor and lead to a redistribution of 
income towards this group with little effects on the growth rate.  
  
In order to capture the effect of shortages of complementary local resources, we 
extend Barro’s model by introducing mineral rents and government sector that 
produces services according to a more skill- intensive technology than the economy as 
a whole, as documented in table 2.1 above.  Table 5.1 below shows the value of input 
from various factors of production from the 1992/93 Social Accounting Matrix for 
Botswana.  We have aggregated all industries excluding mining into the first column.   
 
We first notice the net operating surplus in the private non-mining sector. It is only 
marginally above depreciation, indicating that the return to investments in the private 
sector is close to zero, at least for this particular year.19  This underscores our 
discussion in section 3.1, which concluded that both the private and the public sector 
have cost and efficiency problems in Botswana. 
 
Table 5.1. Factor payments (P million) from the 1992/93 SAM  
Factor of production Industries Mining Central govt. Local govt. 
Professional and technical, citizens  459 34 262 39 
Professional and technical, non-citizens 258 31 70 4 
Administrative and managerial, citizens 164 2 44 8 
Administrative and managerial, non-citizens 165 14 18 1 
Clerical, citizens 404 17 219 38 
Clerical, non-citizens 5 0 0 0 
Skilled manual, citizens 540 182 122 24 
Skilled manual, non-citizens 75 24 0 0 
Unskilled 413 41 140 25 
Informal sector 550 0 0 0 
Net operating surplus 1045 2532 0 36 
Depreciation 1003 157 489 0 
Net taxes and subsidies -30 1 0 0 
Total value added 5052 3034 1363 176 
Source: Central Statistics Office, 1996 
 
Table 5.1 gives a more detailed break down of skill levels than table 2.1.  Besides, it 
distinguishes between citizen and non-citizen employees.  Note, however, that while 
table 2.2 and 2.3 report the distribution of workers on sectors, table 5.1 reports the 
distribution of payments to each skill category.  There are two important features 
worth noticing in this table.  First, as already mentioned, net operating surplus less 
depreciation of capital stems almost entirely from the mineral sector. Second, 
although it may be impossible to import some services, it appears that the problem 
can be overcome to some extent by importing workers.  Thus, notice that more than a 
third of total payments to professional and technical employees, and half of total 
payment to administrative and managerial employees went to non-citizens in all non-
mining industries combined.  In the mining sector the share to non-citizen 
professional, technical, administrative and managerial staff is even larger, reaching 
more than 85 percent in the administrative and managerial category.  The percentage 
distribution of payment to the factors of production is reported in table 5.2.   
 
                                                                 
19 The private return to investment can be positive, however, if tax incentives and other implicit 
subsidies such as  the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) are sufficiently high. 
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Table 5.2. Factor shares from the 1992/93 SAM 
Factor of production Industries Mining Central govt. Local govt. 
Professional and technical, citizens  9.1 1.1 19.2 22.3 
Professional and technical, non-citizens 5.1 1.0 5.1 2.4 
Administrative and managerial, citizens 3.2 0.1 3.2 4.8 
Administrative and managerial, non-citizens 3.3 0.4 1.3 0.8 
Clerical, citizens 8.0 0.6 16.0 21.5 
Clerical, non-citizens 0.1 0 0 0 
Skilled manual, citizens 10.7 6.0 9.0 13.5 
Skilled manual, non-citizens 1.5 0.8 0 0 
Unskilled 8.2 1.3 10.3 14.3 
Informal sector 10.9 0 0 0 
Net operating surplus 20.7 83.4 0 0 
Depreciation 19.8 5.2 35.9 20.4 
Net taxes and subsidies 0.6 0.1 0 0 
Total value added 100 100 100 100 
 
A common interpretation of the figures in table 5.2 is that it takes for example 9.1 + 
5.1 units professional and technical labor input to produce 100 units of goods and 
services in the Botswana business sector. 20    With this interpretation, the table shows 
clearly that the mining sector is the most capital- intensive sector, while the 
government is the most skill- intensive sector. Several studies and policy documents 
have emphasized skill shortages as a constraint to economic development and 
diversification away from the mineral sector.  This table indicates that although there 
may be shortages and the government employs a large share of the skilled labor that 
there is, the private sector can ease the constraint by employing foreign professional 
and skilled workers.  Their salaries and wages are probably higher than the go ing rate 
among citizens of the same skill category, however.   
 
We now return to our question about the optimal size of government, taking into 
account the scarcity of human capital, and the fact that government uses human 
capital intensively.  Using an extended version of Barro’s model and the data 
presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2, we find that if we define skilled labor as professional 
and technical, administrative and managerial, the share employed by government 
should not exceed about 35 percent.  If we include clerical employees and skilled 
manual employees in the human capital stock, the share employed by government 
should not exceed about 20 percent.21  In most categories presented in table 2.2 the 
combined share of central and local government is much higher than that.  The share 
of total employment in government should be below 20 percent since government is 
less intensive in unskilled labor than the private sector.  The present employment 
share in central government of 34 percent (see figure 2.4) is then more than 10 
percentage points above our estimate of the optimal share.  This indicates that a 
reallocation of skilled labor from the public to the private sector would improve the 
level of income in the short run as well as ensure a higher growth rate in the future.   
 
We conclude this section with a cautionary note.  The analysis behind figure 5.1 takes 
as a point of departure that the government produces services that enhances 
productivity in the private sector.  While primary education, preventional health 
                                                                 
20 The necessary condition for this interpretation to hold is that factors of production are being paid 
according to their contribution to value added. 
21 See the appendix for the derivation of the optimal allocation of skills among government and the 
private sector. 
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services, enforcement of law and order and contracts clearly have the properties that 
are assumed for the analysis, other services can hardly be said to oil the wheels of the 
economy. The productivity enhancing effect of government expenditure may 
therefore be exaggerated in this model. 
6 Conclusions  
The role of government has been one of the most central questions in economic theory 
since Adam Smith.  Smith's postulate was that markets provide an efficient allocation 
of resources, provided that certain basic conditions are satisfied.  The government 
then enters the scene when these circumstances are not satisfied.  Economic research 
sought to identify market failures and design government intervention in order to 
remedy such failures.  Thus, it was believed that when markets are not efficient, well-
defined government interventions that would remedy the market failure could be 
designed.  In contrast, more recent research focusing on market failures in the areas of 
asymmetric information and incomplete markets argues that government can not 
always correct market failure and that it seldom has sufficient statistical knowledge to 
know exactly what it should do.22  Besides, there are government failures too.  
 
Three major conclusions can be drawn from the discussions and findings of this 
chapter.  First, the Botswana government is indeed too big both in relation to its own 
resources and compared to what is found to be optimal in empirical and theoretical 
analysis.  The latest figures on government consumption relative to GDP suggest that 
it is around 29 percent of GDP measured at current prices.  This is about 10 
percentage points above what Dowrick (1996) finds to be the upper limit to what will 
foster economic growth.  On this account, the radical approach to public sector reform 
taken in the Botswana National Development Plan 8 and other recent official 
documents is justified.  Developments since the development plan was formulated 
have, however, seen an expansion rather than a reduction in the scale of government.  
Apparently it is easier to expand than to reduce the scale of government, particularly 
when the government has the financial resources to expand without running into 
deficit. 
 
Second, one area where public expenditure could be cut back significant ly, is the 
provision of private goods.  We argue that public sector provision of such goods and 
services crowds out the private sector and thereby probably reduce competition and 
induce inefficiencies in the economy.  Also from a distributional point of view the 
scale of government provision is on the high side for such services.     
 
Third, the greatest challenge facing the Botswana government is the high incidence of 
poverty and the skewed income distribution.  The country can not sustain the present 
income level and growth performance without continued injection of mineral rents 
into the economy if this situation persists. The country will simply not be able to 
transform itself into a modern dynamic economy with close to 40 percent of the 
population below the poverty line.  It is a robust finding within the growth and 
development field of research that a large middleclass is necessary for economic 
growth.  Further, the ticket to the middle class is a job in the formal sector and/or 
setting up a business.  Both routes to prosperity require skills and access to credit.  In 
Botswana skills are probably even more important than in the average middle-income 
                                                                 
22 This discussion draws on Stiglitz (1998). 
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country.  The country is land- locked, sparsely populated, remote relative to  
international markets, and has a relatively high cost level compared to other middle-
income countries.  Therefore, the present income level and growth performance can 
probably only be sustained if industries with a relatively high value added per worker 
take over from the mineral sector and the government as engines of growth.  Since 
Botswana is probably too small for the establishment of large-scale, capital intensive 
industries, competitiveness in skill- intensive industries is probably crucial for future 
growth. This requires a well-educated and motivated labor force.  
 
If endowed with sufficient human capital, Botswana could for example take 
advantage of the rapid growth in international service trade.  Increasingly, 
multinational companies such as airlines, financial service institutions and computer 
software producers to mention but a few, outsource their back-office services to 
developing countries. In order to participate in this trade, good and low-cost 
infrastructure, particularly in telecommunications is needed in addition to skills.  The 
government therefore needs to reassess its role in the telecommunication industry and 
improve the quality of education and the incentives and opportunities to obtain 
education.  
 
To conclude, the Botswana government needs to scale back its activity level by 
withdrawing from the provision of a number of private services, as shown in section 
3.2.  This would create more space for the private sector and introduce competition, 
which in turn would enhance effectiveness.  Liberalization of international trade and 
investment in some areas such as telecommunication, financial services and other 
services and utilities could further enhance competition and improve cost 
effectiveness.  The Botswana government also needs to strengthen areas such as 
health and education in order to meet the challenges from the HIV/Aids epidemic and 
the requirements for an economic transition from stage 2 to stage 4 and 5 in the 
development path we sketched in section 2. In these areas improved efficiency is 
probably the key issue, since the government is already spending more on these 
sectors than almost any country in the world.  
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Redsitribution 
This appendix develops the analytical framework behind figure 4.1 and the analysis in 
section 5.  We start by analyzing government provision of services for redistribution 
reasons.  Assume that there are two types of households in the economy, rich 
households and poor households, earning average incomes yh and yl respectively.  
Further, assume that there are two categories of products in the economy, denoted h 
and b.  Product h is provided by government at a uniform quantity g to all households.  
In addition, households can purchase supplementary quantities of h from the private 
sector.  The products under consideration are goods that are essential for human 
welfare, such as health, or essential inputs in the production of goods and services 
such as services from infrastructure.  In the following we will for short call the 
product health.  The product b should be interpreted as a bundle of goods and services 
that are produced and purchased in the market only.  Both goods are assumed to be 
normal goods (e.g., demand increases with income).  We define households' utility 
function over the two categories of products as follows: 
 
),( bhUU =           (A.1.1) 
 
For illustrative purposes, we specify the utility function as aa -= 1iii bhU where 
ii zgh += .  Health is provided to all households in quantity g.  In addition, 
households purchase an amount z from the market at a unit cost p.  We assume that g 
and z are perfect substitutes.  The cost p is given in terms of quantities of the 
consumer good bundle, b, which is the numeraire of the model. Government produces 
health services at a unit cost p, similar to the private sector.23  Government provision 
is financed by a proportional tax on income, t.  The government budget constraint is 
thus:  
 
( )tmynygpmn hl +£+ )(           (A.1.2) 
 
where n and m are the number of low-income and high- income households 
respectively.  When condition A.1.2 holds with equality, government provision of 
health to each household can be expressed as: 
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( )
( ) ptyy
pmn
tmyny
g hl
hl )1( ss -+=
+
+
=      (A.1.3) 
 
where s is the share of low-income households in total households, e.g., n/(n+m).  
 
The household budget constraint for both households is:  
 
)1( typzb iii -£+       i = l,h       (A.1.4) 
 
                                                                 
23 In section 3.2 we demonstrated that the cost of government provision of goods and services does not 
deviate systematically from private provision of goods and services. 
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Maximizing utility subject to the household budget constraint and combining the  
first-order conditions yield the familiar: 
 
p
gz
b
i
i =
+-a
a
1
        (A.1.5) 
 
Combining this with the household budget constraint yields demand for health 
services in the market as follows: 
 
( ) gt
p
y
z ii )1(1 a
a
---=         (A.1.6) 
 
Consider a government expenditure strategy where the government wants to provide a 
uniform quantity of health services to all households in a way that targets the poor. A 
common assumption in the literature is that government wants to provide the poor 
household with the service up to the point where the poor household would just be 
crowded out from the private market. Given our simple demand structure we find the 
proportional tax necessary to provide such a service by setting (A.1.6) for i = l equal 
to zero and insert in (A.1.3).   This yields: 
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Clearly, 0)/(/  ,0/ <> lh yytt dddsd   Meaning that a large income differential 
between rich and poor households reduces the taxation necessary to finance 
redistribution through expenditure, while a large incidence of poverty increases the 
tax rate necessary to finance equitable expenditure.  If we define poor households as 
those falling below the poverty line; about 40 percent of all households, we have a 
value of s = 0.4 and relative income yh/yl = 7.33 in Botswana.  These are the figures 
used in figure 3.1, while we let a vary.  
 
A.2 Public goods with externalities 
We turn to a dynamic model in order to explore the optimal size of the public sector 
given externalities in the consumption of public services.  Household preferences are 
now represented by intertemporal preferences for consumption: 
 
ò -= dteetcucu tnt r))(()(       (A.2.1) 
 
where c represents household consumption, n is the population growth rate and r the 
household time preference rate.  Further, we define the utility of consumption as 
follows: 
 
q
q
-
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=
-
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1
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cu        (A.2.2) 
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where q is the elasticity of marginal utility.  
 
We introduce an aggregate production function that incorporates the flow of 
government services: 
 
bbb HGALY --= 11        (A.2.3) 
    
where A is an aggregate productivity parameter, L is the labor force, G is the flow of 
government expenditure, and H is the aggregate capital stock in the economy, 
consisting of both physical and human capital.  Notice that the production function is 
subject to constant returns to scale in the private inputs L and H, but it is subject to 
increasing returns when government services are taken into account.  The role of 
government expenditure in the production function is thus to enhance productivity of 
labor.  There are several ways tha t government expenditure may enhance labor 
productivity.  Better communications can for example reduce the time it takes 
workers to get to work, and reduce transport costs in the economy altogether.  
Expenditure on health may reduce absenteeism and so on. The production function 
builds on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).  In per capita terms the production function 
reads: 
 
bb hAGy -= 1         (A.2.3') 
  
Assuming that the capital stock of the economy is ultimately held by households, the 
intertemporal budget constraint is: 
 
chnrwh -++= )(&         (A.2.4) 
 
where the left hand side represents the time derivative of the capital stock per capita, 
or accumulation of capital, w is the wage rate per unit of labor, r is the return to 
capital, and n is the population growth rate.    
 
We can obtain the optimal feasible consumption growth path (or the Euler equation) 
by maximizing (A.2.1) subject to the budget constraint (A.2.4), which yields: 
 
( )r
q
-= r
c
c 1&
        (A.2.5) 
 
Turning to the production side, firms maximize after-tax profits.  It is assumed that 
firms pay a proportionate tax, t on revenue: 
 
rHwLHGALt ---= -- bbbp 11)1(         (A.2.6) 
 
The first-order condition for profit maximization yields: 
 
0)1( 11 =--= -- rhAGt
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d bbb
p
     (A.2.7) 
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Hence capital is employed up to the point where its marginal product equals the cost 
of capital, represented by the interest rate.  We finally turn to the government 
provision of services.  We start by assuming that government services are produced 
by the same technology as the production of goods and services in the private sector, 
e.g., government and private sector production have the same capital and labor 
intensity.  We further assume that the government spends all its tax revenue.  In 
addition, tax revenue is augmented by mineral rent, represented by the parameter s in 
the government budget constraint: 
 
stYG =           (A.2.8) 
 
Using (A.2.8) and (A.2.3), we get ( ) HLtsAG )1/(1/1 bb -= .  We now plug this 
expression into the first-order condition and obtain: 
 
( ) rtsLAt =- - bbbb /)1(/1)1(       (A.2.9) 
 
This expression represents the steady state rate of return to capital in the economy.  
Note that it is a function of exogenous parameters, including the policy parameters t 
and s, only.  The economy is in equilibrium when the rate of interest derived from the 
production side equals the interest rate in the Euler equation (A.2.5).  Thus, we get the 
optimal growth rate of the economy as a function of the tax rate t, the mineral revenue 
injected into the economy, s, the total labor force, L, and the capital share b  as 
follows: 
 
( )rb bbb --= - /)1(/1 )()1( tsLAt
c
c&
     (A.2.10) 
 
It is worth noticing that the growth rate is higher the larger the labor force.  This is a 
common feature of growth models with externalities.  The reason is simply that when 
externalities are present, the more people who can benefit from them, the more 
productive the economy.  However, this feature also implies that large economies 
should grow faster than small economies, which is not supported by the data.  The 
reach of an externality does not necessarily follow international borders, though.  
Therefore, the scale effect from a larger labor force can also be interpreted to mean 
that open economies grow faster than closed economies, which finds empirical 
support.  National borders may nevertheless be most relevant for externalities related 
to government expenditure.  In that case, we can infer that small countries need a 
larger government sector relative to GDP in order to ensure the same increase in labor 
productivity as large countries. Equation (A.2.10) is depicted in figure 5.1 in the 
report.  
 
A.2.1 Government and private sector use different technology 
So far we have assumed that the government and the private sector use the same 
technology and that mineral rents are spent on imports such that additional 
government expenditure resulting from the injection of mineral rents into the 
economy does not draw on scarce labor and capital.   
 
We now relax that restriction and analyze the situation when government is more 
skill- intensive than the private sector and skills can not be imported, at least not 
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without incurring significant costs.  We extend the production function (A.2.3) by 
disaggregating human and physical capital into two distinct inputs.  In addition, we 
introduce the share of labor employed by the private sector denoted by v, the share of 
human capital employed by the private sector denoted u, and the share of physical 
capital employed by the private sector, denoted f.  
 
( ) ( ) sesese )(11 fKuHGvLAY ----=       (A.2.11) 
 
Government services are produced according to the production function 
 
( ) ( ) ( )dgdg KfHuLvG )1()1()1( 1 ---= --      (A.2.12) 
 
We assume that g > e, e.g., the government is more human capital intensive than the 
private sector.  We then insert equation (A.2.12) into equation (A.2.11), and maximize 
the output of Y with respect to the share that the private sector employs of each factor 
of production: 
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This yields the first-order conditions: 
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These conditions are independent on the stock of capital and the labor force and apply 
to the transition path towards steady state growth as well as in steady state.  The 
optimal shares of production factors employed in the private sector depend on the 
relative human and physical capital intensity in the two sectors. Table A.1 below 
shows the values of the parameters and the optimal allocation of skills between 
government and the private sector under different classifications of skills.  The private 
sector includes all sectors except mining. 
 
Table A.1.  Optimal allocation of human capital 
Definition of skill a g b Private share 
u 
Government share 
1-u 
Prof., techn., admin. and manag. 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.64 0.36 
Prof., techn., admin. and manag., 
clerical, skilled manual 
0.41 0.55 0.40 0.80 0.20 
 
We can then finally find the optimal injection of mineral rents in the economy by 
imposing this restriction on the growth model.  In a growth model taxes have a 
 29 
negative impact on growth because it reduces after tax return to physical and human 
capital.  This is counterbalanced by the positive impact government expenditure has 
on economic growth.  Our model will therefore produce the results that government 
should first spend the mineral rents available and only finance the residual between 
the cost of employing the optimal share of factors of production and mineral revenue 
through taxation.  The actual rate of injection of the mineral resources into the 
economy needs to take into account the total stock of mineral resources and the 
consideration that the mineral wealth should be reinvested, not consumed.     
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